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TOURO LAWREVIEW
of the social interest against the weight of the individual
interest. 9 ' Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Byers pointed out
that, in some cases, the courts may give deference to the
legislature where a state is using its police powers to regulate a
legitimate state interest.19
SUPREME COURT
SUFFOLK COUNTY
People v. Shulman'93
(printed December 4, 1997)
Defendant Shulman was accused of a single count of first
degree murder, along with four counts of murder in the second
degree."4 The State had indicated that they would pursue a death
penalty sentence upon conviction. 95 Defendant submitted several
motions seeking to invalidate and declare as unconstitutional
section 400.27 (14)(a)(ii), section 220.10 (5)(e), section 220.30
(3)(b)(vii), and section 220.60 (2) of the New York State
Criminal Procedure Law [hereinafter "CPL"].196 The first stated
191 Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 260.
'
92Byers, 402 U.S. at 432.
193 N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1997, 35 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (14)(a)(ii) provides that:
The defendant shall, unless previously disclosed and subject
to a protective order, make available to the prosecution the
statements and information specified in subdivision two of
section 240.45 and make available for inspection,
photographing copying or testing, subject to constitutional
limitations, the reports, documents, and other property
specified in subdivision one of section 240.30.
Id. N. Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10(5) (e) provides that:
A defendant may not enter a plea of guilty to the crime of
murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of the
penal law; provided, however, that a defendant may enter
[Vol 141262
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section of the CPL requires reciprocal disclosure of evidence
intended to be used by either side at trial.' 7 The remaining
sections, taken collectively, provide that a defendant may not
plead guilty to first degree murder unless the sentence agreed
upon is imprisonment for life without parole, or something
less.198
such a plea with both the permission of the court and the
consent of the people when the agreed upon sentence is either
life imprisonment without parole or a term of imprisonment
for the class A-I felony of murder in the first degree other
than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
Id. N.Y. CRm. PROC. LAW § 220.30(3) (b)(vii) provides that:
A defendant may not enter a plea of guilty to the crime of
murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of the
penal law; provided, however, that a defendant may enter
such a plea with both the permission of the court and the
consent of the people when the agreed upon sentence is either
life imprisonment without parole or a term of imprisonment
for the class A-I felony of murder in the first degree other
than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
Id. N.Y. CRnM PRoc. LAW § 220.60(2) provides:
A defendant who has entered a plea of not guilty to an
indictment may, with both the permission of the court and the
consent of the people, withdraw such plea at any time before
the rendition of a verdict and enter: (a) a plea of guilty to
part of the indictment pursuant to subdivision three or four
but subject to the limitation in subdivision five of section
220.10, or (b) a plea of not responsible by mental disease or
defect to the indictment pursuant to section 220.15 of this
chapter.
Id.
I Id. Sections 240.45(2) and 240.30(1) specify what materials the
defendant is required to disclose as follows:
[W]ritten or recorded statements of those witnesses he/she
intends to call at trial; any records of judgements of
conviction or pending criminal action against such witnesses;
and written reports and documents concerning mental or
physical examinations or scientific tests made by defendant
which he/she intends to introduce at trial.
Id.
"I Id. "The sections further provide that a guilty plea is not authorized
without the permission of the court and the consent of the prosecutor." Id.
1998 1263
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The court denied defendant's motion on reciprocal disclosure
holding that the procedure provided both "fair[ness], and the
effective administration of justice."' 99  It likewise denied
defendant's motion as to the plea bargaining statutes, holding that
they were "constitutionally acceptable."2 0 Defendant claimed
that CPL section 400.27 (14)(a)(ii) violated his rights as set out
under the "Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution, and Article I of the New York
State Constitution." 2 ' He claimed that the article's reciprocal
discovery provision was a form of self incrimination, which
would force him to disclose his prospective witness list, all
information pertinent to those witnesses, as well as any medical
and scientific evidence he intended to introduce. 202 This would,
he contends, have a "chilling effect" on his available options and
strategies during the sentencing phase of his trial.20 3
The court, relying on Williams v. Florida2° disagreed.2 5 The
Florida rule in question was similar to CPL section 240.30.206 It
' Id (citing People v. Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d 222, 406 N.E.2d 465, 428
N.Y.S.2d 649 (1980)).
200 Id. (citing People v. McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d 727, 662 N.Y.S.2d 214
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1997).
201 Id See U.S. CONST amend. V. (stating that "[n]o person.., shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.. . "); U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (which states that the accused shall "have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense."); U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII (stating that there shall
be no "cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
(stating that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."). N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 6. Article I § 6 states in pertinent part that "No person ... shall he be in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... ." Id.
2 Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1997, at 35.
203 Id.
2w 399 U.S. 78 (1970). In Williams, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a Florida rule which required that witness information
pertinent to a claimed alibi be turned over to the prosecution. Id at 83.
Defendant contended that this notice of alibi rule compels him in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Id. at 79.
205 Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1997, at 35.
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allowed that in return for a defendant's disclosure concerning
witnesses he intended to call to substantiate his alibi, the State
must give notice to the defendant regarding every witness it
intended to call in rebuttal.' Defendant contended that allowing
this type of discovery by the State would inevitably deny him
"due process" and a "fair trial."m In concluding that the statute
enhanced the search for truth, the Court noted that "the privilege
against self incrimination is not violated by a requirement that the
defendant give notice of an alibi defense and disclose his alibi
witnesses." O
The Shulman court also looked for guidance from the New
York Court of Appeals' decision in People v. Copicotto.210  In
Copicotto, defendants appealed their conviction for petit larceny
and theft, contending that the government improperly granted
discovery of certain evidence. 211 The court disagreed and
concluded that the rules embodied in CPL section 240 were
designed to promote justice and enhance fairness in our
adversarial system.2 12 While noting that care should be taken to
ensure that no criminal defendant is compelled to act as a witness
against his own interest, the court nonetheless held that the "Fifth
Amendment privilege proscribes only testimonial compulsion, not
20 Id. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 80. Justice White interpreted the Florida
rule as "in essence a requirement that a defendant submit to a limited form of
pretrial discovery by the State whenever he intends to rely at trial on the
defense of alibi." Id.
2 Id.
21 Id. at 81.
2 Id. at 83. The United States Supreme Court remarked that "[tihe
adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in
which players enjoy an absolute right to conceal their hands until played." Id.
at 82.
210 People v. Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d 222, 406 N.E.2d 465, 428 N.Y.S.2d 649
(1980).
211 Id. at 225, 406 N.E.2d at 467, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 467. The items in
question were "sales receipts in defendants' possession, allegedly for the
property which was the subject of the charge" but which "actually represented
purchases made after defendants had been arrested and questioned." Id.
212 Id. at 230, 406 N.E.2d at 471, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 655. "States are free to
experiment 'with systems of broad discovery designed to achieve these
goals.'" Id. (citation omitted).
1998 1265
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that which merely makes a person the source of real or physical
evidence. "13
Finally, the Shulman court considered the proposition that a
capital case should merit a heightened level of due process .214 In
People v. Bastien,215 defendant made a similar due process
argument. 16 Defendant was arrested and charged with first
degree murder for allegedly shooting and killing a man.217
Defendant argued that he was entitled to special consideration
regarding certain discovery materials "because of the heightened
due process requirements for capital cases required by the
Federal and New York Constitutions. " "' The court rejected this
argument entirely, noting that the defendant could not cite to a
single New York case to support his claim.219 The court closed
its discussion of this subject with the definitive statement that
"[i]n drafting legislation which authorizes imposition of the death
penalty or life without parole in certain cases, the legislature
made no provision for additional discovery procedures, and there
is no other authorization for the discovery which the defendant
seeks. "m
As to the question of reciprocal discovery, it is clear that the
federal and state constitutions are in congruence. As noted by
Chief Judge Cooke in Copicotto, " [tihe criminal discovery
procedure embodied in article 240 [was] adopted in substance
from Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."' Both
courts in this case are drawing their water from the same well.
213 Id. at 228, 406 N.E.2d at 469, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 654. "[N]othing in the
Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a matter of constitutional
right to await the end of the State's case before announcing the nature of his
defense." Id. at 229, 406 N.E.2d at 470, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 654 (citing
Williams, 399 U.S. 78) (additional citations omitted).
214 People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1997 at 35.
211 170 Misc. 2d 103, 649 N.E.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1996).
216 1d. at 104, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
217 Id.
211 Id. at 105, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
2191d.
2 Id.
2 Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d at 226, 406 N.E.2d at 468, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
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Defendant argued separately that CPL sections 220.10 (5)(e),
220.30 (30)(b)(vii), and 220.60 (2) which, taken as a whole,
"provide that an accused may not enter a plea of guilty to the
crime of murder in the first degree unless the agreed-upon
sentence is either life imprisonment without parole or a lessor
term of imprisonment" violates his rights under the Fifth, Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
and Article I, section 2 of the New York Constitution.'
Defendant argued that under the holding of United States v.
Jackson ' his constitutional rights were "impermissibly
burdened."2 '4 In Jackson, the defendants had kidnapped and
harmed their victim, and were therefore charged with a death
penalty offenseP under the Federal Kidnapping Act. The
statute provided that it was for to the jury to determine if death
was the appropriate penalty. 227 The statute did not however,
make any provision for imposing a death penalty when the
defendant either pleads guilty or waives his right to a jury trial.'
The effect of this rule was to penalize the defendant who chose to
222 People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1997 at 35. See also N.Y. CONST
art. I, § 2. This section provides in pertinent part that "trial by jury in all
cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision
shall remain inviolate forever" and that "[a] jury trial may be waived by the
defendant in all criminal cases, except those in which the crime charged may
be punishable by death . I..." d
223390 U.S. 570 (1968).
4 Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1997, at 35 (citing Jackson, 390 U.S. at
583). The death penalty statute in Jackson was part of the Federal Kidnapping
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a), which provides:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate... commerce,
any person who has been unlawuy... kidnapped... and
held for ransom ... or otherwise ... shall be punished (1)
by death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated
unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend,
or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if
the death penalty is not imposed.
Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570-71.
m Jackson, 390 U.S. at 571.
18 U.S.C.§ 1201(a).
227 Id.
'a Id.
1998 1267
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exercise his right to be tried by a jury of his peers, for only by
choosing a jury trial could he conceivably be executedY 9 The
Court held that such a provision inevitably caused a "chilling
effect" on the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of the
defendant, and struck it down.3 0
In Shulman, defendant argued that New York courts should
follow the holding of Jackson, as the court did in People v.
Hale.231 In Hale, defendant was arrested and charged with crimes
that included capitol murder, a death penalty offense. 2 Citing
Jackson, the defendant in Hale argued that the statutory plea
provisions of the New York CPL233 effectively penalize the
defendant's election of a jury trial, as opposed to negotiating a
plea with the district attorney.3 4  Defendant contended that he
would face death only by exercising his rights under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, and the law must therefore be
unconstitutionalY 5 The People attempted to distinguish the New
York statutes by pointing out that there was no provision
contained therein were allowed the defendant to waive his right to
a jury trial.236 Furthermore, the People argued that, unlike
Jackson, in New York, a defendant could only plead guilty to a
capital crime after securing the consent of the court and
permission of the People 3 7  The court found the People's
" Id. at 581. Under the Federal Kidnapping act, therefore, a defendant who
abandons his right to contest his guilt before a jury is assured that he cannot be
executed; the defendant ingenuous enough to seek a jury acquittal stands
forewarned that, if the jury finds him guilty and does not wish to spare his life,
he will die. Id.
230 Id. at 585. The Court opined that "[w]hatever the power of Congress to
impose a death penalty for violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act, Congress
cannot impose such a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the
assertion of a constitutional right. Id. at 583.
2' 173 Misc. 2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997).232 Id. at 152, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
23' CPL §§ 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii)and 220.60(2).
' Hale, 173 Misc. 2d at 178-79, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80.
23' Id. at 179-80, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80.
236 Id. at 180, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 480. Therefore, the People argued, "capitol
defendants are not needlessly encouraged to abandon that right. ... " Id.
237 Id. at 181, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
1268 [Vol 14
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reasoning to be unpersuasive. z 8 Citing the New York Court of
Appeals reasoning in People v. Lee, 39 the Hale court maintained
that the People had failed to adequately distinguish the New York
statutes, and granted defendant's motion to strike them.24
The Shulman court was unpersuaded by the Hale opinion 41 ,
and instead looked to the reasoning of People v. Mclntosh.242
The defendant in McIntosh was likewise charged with a death
penalty offense.243 He too attempted to have the statutes declared
unconstitutional. 2' However, the McIntosh court was able to see
the distinction between the Federal Kidnapping Act death penalty
statute and the New York State death penalty statutes.245 It held
that since a plea must be negotiated, and cannot be entered
unilaterally, there is no "needless encouragement of a defendant's
waivers of his/her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights."246 The
McIntosh court saw this as little more than plea bargaining, a
time honored and indispensable tool in the criminal justice
system.247  The Shulman court agreed, and ruled that the
238 Id. at 184, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
239 58 N.Y.2d 491, 448 N.E.2d 1328, 462 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1983). Defendant
was arrested and charged for carrying an open container of beer in the Village
of Monticello and pled guilty to the charge, which was affirmed on appeal.
The court, in dicta, stated that "[t]here can be no doubt that ... a plea (of
guilty) constitutes an effective judicial admission by a defendant... and
waives such trial rights as the privilege against self incrimination (and) the
right to trial by jury." Id. at 493-94, 448 N.E.2d at 1329, 462 N.Y.S.2d at
418.
240 Hale, 173 Misc. 2d at 193-94, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 488. "What is forbidden
is a scheme, like New York's, in which the possibility of death only arises
from the defendant's exercise of his right to a jury trial." Id. at 182, 661
N.Y.S.2d at 481.
241 People v. Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4,1997, at 35.
242 173 Misc. 2d 727, 662 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997).
243 Id. at 728, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 729, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
246 Id. at 730, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
247 Id. "Plea bargaining is now established as a vital part of our criminal
justice system.... [If full trials were required in each case New York's law
enforcement system would collapse." Id.
1998 1269
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defendant had failed to meet his burden of proving
unconstitutionality.248
The federal and state constitutional provisions under which the
defendant in Shulman challenged the plea provisions of CPL
sections 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(3)(b)(vii), and 220.60(2) are
substantially the same. 249 The difference in outcome between the
federal and state cases cited herein lies in the ability of the
adjudicating magistrate to see the distinction between a statute
which "impermissibly burdens" a defendants constitutional
rights, as in Jackson,250 and one which allows for plea negotiation
and mutual decision making between the various parties
involved. 25'
248 Shulman, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1997, at 36.
249 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
250 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572.
2' McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d at 733, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 218. "Under this
standard, a plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the
possibility of a death penalty." Id. at 734, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 219 (additional
citation omitted).
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